Purges Within PLA Leadership: Military Threat and Taiwan Crisis Risks Escalate
The Storm Media Commentary, November 6, 2026
At this Fifth Plenum, a total of 24 Central Committee members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were expelled, but only 10 alternate members, including Lu Dongliang, were promoted to full membership. Notably, none of the 10 newly promoted members came from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) or the People's Armed Police (PAP). Among the five alternate members who should have been promoted according to their ranking but were "skipped" were Lieutenant General Fu Wenhua, the former commander of the Beijing Garrison who was later transferred to serve as deputy commander of the PAP, and Lieutenant General Zhu Wenxiang, also a deputy commander of the PAP.
Another sign that internal purges within the PLA remain ongoing indicates that the campaign has not only continued but has also extended downward to operational combat units. This has affected troop morale and may have left Chinese President Xi Jinping, despite firmly maintaining control over the military, less trusting of the armed forces than he was before the large-scale purges began. Since January 1 of this year, there have been no publicly reported visits by Mr. Xi to military units across the country, a marked contrast to seven such visits in 2023, nine in 2024, and five in 2025.
The removal of numerous PLA generals and senior lieutenant generals has resulted in replacements who generally possess less experience and fewer professional qualifications than their predecessors. With almost the entire senior leadership structure facing a severe shortage of experienced personnel, the quality of PLA decision-making, force development, and management will inevitably decline over the next three to four years. This will also affect the PLA's ability to respond to major unplanned or unexpected events, such as large-scale disasters, prolonged and extensive military power projection overseas, and the conduct of joint operations.
In particular, when Mr. Xi initiated military reforms in 2015, one of his objectives was to eliminate the risks associated with the excessive autonomy of the seven former military regions, which had previously possessed the ability to act independently. Following the reforms, the five theater commands became dependent on cooperation among multiple departments when deploying combat forces above a certain scale, thereby reducing their autonomy. For example, logistics support depends on the Joint Logistic Support Force; mobilization is coordinated by the Central Military Commission's National Defense Mobilization Department through provincial military districts; satellite navigation requires support from the Aerospace Force; and military communications rely on the Information Support Force. If the leaders of these departments generally lack professional expertise and experience, the quality of their cooperation can readily be imagined.
More importantly, if his trust in the military has indeed declined because the purges have extended to operational combat units, then Mr. Xi may become less willing to launch large-scale military operations abroad for fear of granting combat forces excessive operational autonomy.
As for PLA activities around Taiwan, the impact is unlikely to be substantial. This is because routine PLA exercises, battlefield preparation activities, and gray-zone operations around Taiwan have long been delegated to the Eastern Theater Command for planning, design, and execution. Theater command staff have already developed established operational procedures, including those governing gray-zone activities against Taiwan, and are therefore relatively insulated from changes in senior leadership. This is demonstrated by the Eastern Theater Command's ability to plan and execute the large-scale, Taiwan-focused "Justice Mission 2025" military exercise within just 12 days, despite significant personnel turbulence at the senior leadership level.
What Taiwan must remain highly vigilant about is the possibility that a crisis could emerge across the Taiwan Strait due to major political disputes, military accidents, or an unintended exchange of fire. Following the purges, senior Communist party, government, and military officials may be "strong in loyalty but weak in professional competence." Moreover, when expressing their views, they may attempt to anticipate their superiors' preferences rather than speak candidly. At the same time, senior PLA officers and commanders of operational units may adopt an approach of "erring on the side of excessive toughness rather than restraint," preferring to act more aggressively to conform to nationalist sentiment instead of recommending de-escalation. Under such circumstances, misjudgments by the CCP leadership or deliberately aggressive actions by the PLA could rapidly escalate tensions and significantly increase the difficulty of crisis management.